sedian

Seguridad Digital
de Andalucía

Guía del usuario

Análisis de tráfico de red: Técnicas avanzadas de detección y análisis de red

V1.0

Junta de Andalucía

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Algo sobre mí

- Responsable de negocio de seguridad en **SEMIC**
- Autor del blog **hacking-etico.com**
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OBJETIVOS

- Entender la finalidad del análisis de tráfico de red.
- Aprender diferentes métodos de análisis de tráfico de red en función de la finalidad.
- Diferenciar entre *Life Analysis* vs *Death Analysis*.
- Aprender a utilizar herramientas de captura y análisis de tráfico.
- Aprender a utilizar IDS para la detección de amenazas.
- Aprender a recolectar información para facilitar su análisis.

Análisis de tráfico de red: ¿Para qué?

- Detección de problemas de **rendimiento**.
- Detección de posibles **amenazas**.
- Detección de **ataques**.
- Pruebas de seguridad ofensiva para mejorar la seguridad defensiva (**Red** vs **Blue**).
- Analizar un **incidente** de seguridad en su fase de detección, análisis, contención, erradicación, lecciones aprendidas…
- **Mediciones** y **métricas** de seguridad.
- **Mejora continua**.

Como respuesta a un incidente

- ***Life Analysis***
  - Artefactos latentes en la red
  - Análisis del tráfico
    - Analizadores / Sniffers
    - FW / IDS / IPS / NTA / UEBA
- ***Death Analysis***
  - Posibles rastros en los sistemas
    - pcap / logs
  - Análisis del tráfico
    - Analizadores / IDS / SIEM

Ataque, Detección, Respuesta y Análisis



Herramientas a utilizar

- Durante esta sesión se verán algunos ejemplos de usos de las siguientes herramientas de análisis, detección y recolección.
- **NetworkMiner** y **Wireshark** para el análisis de tráfico.
- **Snort** como IDS para la detección de amenazas / ataques.
- Stack de **ELK** para la recolección de logs y visualización amigable.

Ya tengo el arsenal, ¿y ahora qué analizo?

- ¿Atacante externo o interno?
- ¿Qué tácticas ha seguido el atacante?
- ¿Qué técnicas ha utilizado el atacante?
- **MITRE ATT&CK**
  - Desarrollado por MITRE.
  - Matriz de referencia de posibles procedimientos, tácticas y técnicas utilizadas.
  - Categorizados por Sistemas Operativos, Dispositivos Móviles, Entornos Cloud o ICS (Sistemas de Control Industrial)

Tácticas y técnicas de las APT

- **APT** (*Advanced Persisten Threat*)
- Diferentes grupos de operaciones APT
- MITRE tiene cerca de 100 operaciones APT identificadas y registradas en su ATT&CK
  - *Lazarus Group, Equation Group (Shadow Brokers), Fancy Bear (APT 28), Machete, Elfin (APT 33)...*
  - Tácticas y técnicas en común.
  - Nos puede servir para saber cuáles son las más usadas.



MITRE ATT&CK: Navigator



Ahora sí, pasemos a analizar tráfico

arp_spoof.pcap	06/01/2014 23:57	Wireshark capture...	27 KB
heart.pcap	20/04/2014 20:49	Wireshark capture...	25 KB
hydra_ftp.pcap	25/09/2012 21:27	Wireshark capture...	30 KB
hydra_telnet.pcap	12/01/2014 12:50	Wireshark capture...	64 KB
nmap.pcap	25/09/2012 21:27	Wireshark capture...	169 KB
ntp.pcap	09/01/2014 16:35	Wireshark capture...	4 KB
snmp.pcap	09/01/2014 16:36	Wireshark capture...	12 KB
with_pdf.pcap	05/01/2014 20:27	Wireshark capture...	350 KB

NetworkMiner: FTP Brute Force Attack



Client	Server	Protocol	Username	Password	Valid login	Login timestamp
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	password	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	none	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	fred	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	napier123	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	anon	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	fred	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	napier	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test1	anon	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	anon	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	napier123	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test1	napier	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	none	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	admin	napier	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test	password	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test1	fred	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC
192.168.75.1	192.168.75.132 (Windows)	FTP	test1	none	Unknown	2010-01-04 10:19:34 UTC

NetworkMiner: Extracción de ficheros



Wireshark: Opciones de captura



Wireshark: Filtro de captura



Wireshark: Partes de la pantalla principal



Wireshark: Empezar por las estadísticas



Address	Packets	ytes	Tx Packets	Tx Bytes	Rx Packets	Rx Bytes	Country	City	AS Number	AS Organization
[redacted]	355	239 k	117	24 k	238	215 k	—	—	—	—
	150	174 k	131	172 k	19	2409	—	—	—	—
5	91	54 k	59	38 k	32	16 k	—	—	—	—
	36	2268	18	1080	18	1188	—	—	—	—
31	16	1298	10	779	6	519	—	—	—	—
0	13	858	0	0	13	858	—	—	—	—
1	9	1003	5	775	4	228	—	—	—	—
50	8	1196	4	673	4	523	—	—	—	—
6	6	544	2	220	4	324	—	—	—	—
4	6	480	2	186	4	294	—	—	—	—
37	5	712	3	529	2	183	—	—	—	—
2	3	381	1	229	2	152	—	—	—	—
	3	381	1	229	2	152	—	—	—	—
6	3	240	1	93	2	147	—	—	—	—
4	3	240	1	93	2	147	—	—	—	—
	2	132	0	0	2	132	—	—	—	—
89	2	161	1	107	1	54	—	—	—	—
	1	46	1	46	0	0	—	—	—	—
	1	60	0	0	1	60	—	—	—	—
	1	46	0	0	1	46	—	—	—	—

Wireshark: Identificando tráfico cryptolocker



Wireshark: Filtro por host y protocolo



Wireshark: Filtro y exportación de objetos

with_pdf.pcap

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

http.content_type == "application/pdf"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
114	3.236365	98.139.134.174	192.168.47.171	HTTP	391	HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content (application/pdf)
163	4.133397	98.139.134.174	192.168.47.171	HTTP	459	HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content (application/pdf)
241	4.596883	98.139.134.174	192.168.47.171	HTTP	1350	HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content (application/pdf)
305	5.764174	98.139.134.174	192.168.47.171	HTTP	650	HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content (application/pdf)
378	6.817552	98.139.134.174	192.168.47.171	HTTP	269	HTTP/1.1 206 Partial Content (application/pdf)

Wireshark · Export · HTTP object list

Packet	Hostname	Content Type	Size	Filename
7	www.google.co.uk	text/html	413 bytes	url?sa=t&rct=j&q=
39	www.pdf995.com	image/x-icon	261 bytes	favicon.ico
114	www.pdf995.com	application/pdf	65 kB	pdf.pdf
163	www.pdf995.com	application/pdf	40 kB	pdf.pdf
241	www.pdf995.com	application/pdf	65 kB	pdf.pdf
305	www.pdf995.com	application/pdf	65 kB	pdf.pdf
378	www.pdf995.com	application/pdf	65 kB	pdf.pdf

Wireshark: Analizando APT Taidoor

Wireshark · Conversations · Taidoor_APT.pcap

Ethernet · 9 | IPv4 · 5 | IPv6 | TCP · 34 | UDP · 4

Address A	Address B	Packets	Bytes	Packets A → B	Bytes A → B	Packets B → A	Bytes B → A	Rel Start	Duration	Bits/s A → B	Bits/s B → A
172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	263	21 k	142	14 k	121	7260	82.873730	83.7390	1370	
172.16.253.1	172.16.253.255	9	2648	9	2648	0	0	0.000000	157.9341	134	
172.16.253.132	224.0.0.22	7	378	7	378	0	0	73.500396	15.8920	190	
172.16.253.132	172.16.253.254	4	808	0	0	4	808	69.079289	1.0034	0	
0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	2	697	2	697	0	0	69.078588	1.0017	5566	

ip.addr==172.16.253.132 && ip.addr==211.234.117.141

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
23	82.873730	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	62	1229 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
24	83.139209	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1229 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
25	83.139293	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	54	1229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
26	83.139466	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /gmzlk.php?id=031870111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
27	83.139619	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1229 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=195 Win=64240 Len=0
28	83.414936	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1229 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=195 Win=64240 Len=0
29	83.415014	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	54	1229 → 443 [ACK] Seq=195 Ack=2 Win=64240 Len=0
30	83.415295	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	54	1229 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=195 Ack=2 Win=64240 Len=0
31	83.415426	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1229 [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=196 Win=64239 Len=0
32	85.404991	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	62	1230 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1
33	85.638192	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1230 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
34	85.638231	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	TCP	54	1230 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
35	85.638395	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /viswi.php?id=001090111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
36	85.638544	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1230 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=195 Win=64240 Len=0
37	85.912159	211.234.117.141	172.16.253.132	TCP	60	443 → 1230 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=195 Win=64240 Len=0

Wireshark: Analizando APT Taidoor



No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
26	83.139466	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /gmzlk.php?id=031870111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
35	85.638395	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /viswi.php?id=001090111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
44	88.148314	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /obeaa.php?id=021655111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
58	90.654033	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /vrjfj.php?id=007090111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
64	93.157641	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /zqmse.php?id=013197111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
73	95.600532	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /ivzdi.php?id=010093111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
83	98.097168	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /ipubv.php?id=008698111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
89	100.577374	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /zeyys.php?id=027858111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
98	103.061175	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /gpaqi.php?id=027619111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
107	105.519200	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /hgsht.php?id=019957111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
113	108.051386	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /gftqr.php?id=022816111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
119	110.518423	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /tyrae.php?id=005421111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
128	112.989890	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /cidso.php?id=028428111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
137	115.473787	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /xmeqb.php?id=006115111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
146	117.952542	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /gauhx.php?id=010093111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1
155	120.430136	172.16.253.132	211.234.117.141	HTTP	248	GET /wwekz.php?id=015513111D309GE67E HTTP/1.1

Tshark: Muy útil para scripting

```
tshark -r test.pcap -R "http && tcp.dstport==80" -Tfields -e ip.dst
```

```
root@kali:/home/miguel/python/scripts# tshark -r test.pcap -R "http && tcp.dstport==80" -Tfields -e ip.dst
tshark: Lua: Error during loading:
 [string "/usr/share/wireshark/init.lua"]:46: dofile has been disabled due to running Wireshark as superuse
up/CapturePrivileges for help in running Wireshark as an unprivileged user.
Running as user "root" and group "root". This could be dangerous.
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
195.57.153.40
173.194.67.95
95.130.50.121
94.23.81.104
93.184.220.111
68.232.35.121
95.130.50.121
192.0.76.3
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
95.130.50.121
```

Tshark: Ejemplo de script de geolocalización

```
 GNU nano 2.2.6                                File: localiza2.py

#!/usr/bin/env python

import pygeoip
import sys

geo = pygeoip.GeoIP('GeoLiteCity.dat')

for line in sys.stdin:
        sys.stdout.write(line)
        print geo.record_by_addr(line)
```

```
tshark -r test.pcap -R "http && tcp.dstport==80" -Tfields -e ip.dst | sort -u | python localiza2.py
```

```
192.0.76.3
{'city': u'San Francisco', 'region_code': u'CA', 'area_code': 415, 'time_zone': 'America/Los_
CA', 'country_code3': 'USA', 'latitude': 37.748400000000004, 'postal_code': u'94110', 'longit
nited States', 'continent': 'NA'}
195.57.153.40
{'city': None, 'region_code': None, 'area_code': 0, 'time_zone': None, 'dma_code': 0, 'metro_
ostal_code': None, 'longitude': -4.0, 'country_code': 'ES', 'country_name': 'Spain', 'contine
195.57.81.80
{'city': None, 'region_code': None, 'area_code': 0, 'time_zone': None, 'dma_code': 0, 'metro_
ostal_code': None, 'longitude': -4.0, 'country_code': 'ES', 'country_name': 'Spain', 'contine
23.214.148.124
{'city': u'Amsterdam', 'region_code': u'07', 'area_code': 0, 'time_zone': 'Europe/Amsterdam',
', 'latitude': 52.349999999999994, 'postal_code': None, 'longitude': 4.916699999999992, 'coun
t': 'EU'}
54.209.104.176
{'city': u'Ashburn', 'region_code': u'VA', 'area_code': 703, 'time_zone': 'America/New_York',
```

Snort: Detección off-line de ataques

- Utilización del IDS en modo off-line (packet dump [pcap])
- Uso de las reglas *community* de **Snort**
- Posibilidad de añadir reglas ET (**Emerging Threat**)
- Alertas en consola
- Para facilitar análisis, alertas a ficheros logs
- Posibilidad de explotación posterior de los ficheros logs

Snort: Detección off-line de ataques

```
ubuntu@ip-172-26-0-74:~$ nmap -v -sT 172.26.6.119 -A

Starting Nmap 7.60 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-07-09 19:47 UTC
NSE: Loaded 146 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 19:47
Completed NSE at 19:47, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at
Completed NSE at
Initiating Ping S
Scanning 172.26.6
Completed Ping Sc
Initiating Parall
Completed Paralle
Initiating Connec
```

```
07/09-19:47:46.691300 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:8087 -> 172.26.0.74:32986
07/09-19:47:46.691319 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:47828 -> 172.26.6.119:1095
07/09-19:47:46.691326 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:1095 -> 172.26.0.74:47828
07/09-19:47:46.691351 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:36400 -> 172.26.6.119:541
07/09-19:47:46.691359 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:541 -> 172.26.0.74:36400
07/09-19:47:46.691393 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:51826 -> 172.26.6.119:41511
07/09-19:47:46.691401 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:41511 -> 172.26.0.74:51826
07/09-19:47:46.691418 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:32788 -> 172.26.6.119:3390
07/09-19:47:46.691425 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:3390 -> 172.26.0.74:32788
07/09-19:47:46.691453 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:41512 -> 172.26.6.119:8500
07/09-19:47:46.691462 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:8500 -> 172.26.0.74:41512
07/09-19:47:46.691488 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:50422 -> 172.26.6.119:9099
07/09-19:47:46.691495 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:9099 -> 172.26.0.74:50422
07/09-19:47:46.691521 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:50712 -> 172.26.6.119:65129
07/09-19:47:46.691528 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:65129 -> 172.26.0.74:50712
07/09-19:47:46.691551 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:34830 -> 172.26.6.119:60443
07/09-19:47:46.691557 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:60443 -> 172.26.0.74:34830
07/09-19:47:46.691590 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:55480 -> 172.26.6.119:49176
07/09-19:47:46.691598 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:49176 -> 172.26.0.74:55480
07/09-19:47:46.691617 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:48816 -> 172.26.6.119:4321
07/09-19:47:46.691623 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:4321 -> 172.26.0.74:48816
07/09-19:47:46.691654 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:45746 -> 172.26.6.119:1090
07/09-19:47:46.691662 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.6.119:1090 -> 172.26.0.74:45746
07/09-19:47:46.691686 [**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**] [Priority: 0] {TCP} 172.26.0.74:49394 -> 172.26.6.119:3945
```

Snort: Análisis del log (/var/log/alert)

```
[Priority: 0]
07/09-17:52:24.004036 [redacted]:14731 -> 172.26.6.119:22
TCP TTL:99 TOS:0x0 ID:15776 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x3B71AE0D  Ack: 0xA1D865BD  Win: 0x201  TcpLen: 20

[**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**]
[Priority: 0]
07/09-17:52:30.096057 [redacted].:15093 -> 172.26.6.119:22
TCP TTL:99 TOS:0x0 ID:15777 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x4E9AC40B  Ack: 0x612FF9B  Win: 0x1171  TcpLen: 20

[**] [1:1000006:2] "Escaneo de puertos TCP" [**]
[Priority: 0]
07/09-17:52:33.393265 [redacted]:15093 -> 172.26.6.119:22
TCP TTL:99 TOS:0x0 ID:15778 IpLen:20 DgmLen:104 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0x4E9AC40B  Ack: 0x612FF9B  Win: 0x1171  TcpLen: 20

[**] [1:254:4] DNS SPOOF query response with TTL of 1 min. and no authority [**]
[Classification: Potentially Bad Traffic] [Priority: 2]
07/09-17:54:27.797113 172.26.0.2:53 -> 172.26.6.119:46203
UDP TTL:255 TOS:0x0 ID:38732 IpLen:20 DgmLen:107
Len: 79
```

ELK: Facilitar análisis con stack ELK



ELK: Facilitar análisis con stack ELK



Gracias


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avante
¿hasta dónde quieres llegar?

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